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ABSTRACT: This article describes a cultural production process called religification, in
which religious affiliation, rather than race or ethnicity, has become the core category of
identity for working class Pakistani-American youth in the United States. In this
dialectical process, triggered by political changes following the September 11 terrorist
attacks, the Muslim identity is both thrust upon Pakistani-American youth by those
who question their citizenship and embraced by the youth themselves. Specifically, the
article examines the ways in which schools are sites where citizenship is both
constructed and contested, and the roles that peers, school personnel, families, and the
youth themselves play in this construction/contestation of citizenship.
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Introduction
Like the Rushdie Affair in the UK, the 9/11 terrorist attack was a watershed for
Muslims in the US, with ramifications for Muslims across the world. [1] As a result,
there has been a barrage of research, particularly on young Muslims living in the US
(see, for example, Bayoumi, 2008; Cainkar, 2009; Ewing, 2009; Sirin and Fine, 2008;
Maira, 2009). Common themes in this research include questions of citizenship and
identity. Moreover, much of this research responds to the construction of Muslims as an
“an alienated, problematic minority” (Werbner, 2004, p. 897) and traces its genealogy to
September 11. Maira (2009) refers to scholarship in this period as “post-9/11 area
studies” (p. 29).
My research also falls under the rubric of “post-9/11 studies.” However, I did
not start out to explore “how it feels to be a problem,” as Bayoumi (2008) asserts in the
provocative title of his book on young Muslims in America. Rather, as a Pakistani
Muslim myself, I wanted to challenge what had become a common sense categorization
of Muslims as a monolithic group by paying attention to one group that fell under this
umbrella term: working-class and lower middle-class Pakistani-American [2] youth. I
was especially interested in the local processes of cultural production in an urban public
school and the ways in which Pakistani-American youth were negotiating the
expectations of school personnel, their families, and their communities. Although I did
not ignore the importance of September 11 and how it had made Pakistani and Muslim
youth in general more visible and more vulnerable, I had not anticipated the ways in
which the post-9/11 world grouped Muslims as a homogenous, single entity, with
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grave implications for notions of citizenship. Thus, while my larger research project
focused on academic engagement and socialization of Pakistani-American youth, this
paper focuses specifically on Pakistani-American youth’s constructions of citizenship
and national belonging and its implications for their socialization in schools.
Drawing on ethnographic data, I argue that we are witnessing a post-9/11 shift
in the ways in which Pakistani-American youth (and presumably other similar groups)
identify themselves and are identified by others. While racialization continues to be the
dominant form of categorizing individuals and groups, in the case of PakistaniAmerican youth, religion trumps race, although race, class, and gender are implicated
in this process. Not only do peers and school personnel view these youth through a
religious lens, the youth (and their families) define themselves more through a religious
identity than through a racial, national, or ethnic one. I call this dialectical process
religification.
This article describes the cultural production process of religification: how
working- and lower middle-class Pakistani-American youth are positioned at the
national and local level as outsiders, and how they position themselves in relation to
their own notions of citizenship and national belonging. I argue that the religification of
urban, working- and lower middle-class Pakistani-American youth, that is, the
ascription and co-option of a religious identity, trumps other forms of categorization,
such as race and ethnicity. Furthermore, religification significantly influences the
youth’s identities, socialization, notions of citizenship, and feelings of belonging. As
Amartya Sen (2006) argues, the ascription of Islamic identity over all other “affiliations,
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priorities, and pursuits that a Muslim person may have” is something that needs to be
taken seriously (para. 4). Certainly race and ethnicity are complicated in ways in which
Muslims are imagined to look; as one white non-Muslim student in my study observed,
“some people assume that all the Muslims … have to have black hair and dark skin”
(focus group, 05/15/08). In an age of insecurity, the connotations that Muslim imagery
holds over the imagination (as illustrated in the drawings created in the infamous
Danish cartoon controversy), as well as media representations of Muslims and
Pakistanis in particular [3], not only affect the ways in which Pakistani-American youth
are viewed by others, but also how they view themselves. However, my research
suggests that it is ultimately religion that is used to define Pakistani-American youth
and serves to mark them as noncitizens. While the ascription of a religious identity
over all other possibilities is not entirely new—we have observed this before with
Jews—there is a notable difference in the way that youth themselves are choosing and
using their religious identity. Thus, the Muslim categorization is not only bestowed on
the youth by those who question their citizenship but also embraced by the youth
themselves as a form of resistance. I contend that this dialectical process of religification
can be directly attributed to the changes in the world order after September 11.

Questioning Citizenship: Geopolitics and Pakistani-Americans
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001 drastically
changed the lives of many Pakistani-Americans. Thousands of men disappeared from
Pakistani-immigrant neighborhoods across the country, particularly in major cities such
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as Chicago (Bahl, Johnson, and Seim, 2003) and New York (Powell, 2003). In January
2002, the Department of Homeland Security enforced the National Entry-Exit
Registration System (NSEERS) as part of the USA PATRIOT Act; accordingly,
noncitizen males from 25 countries that were “designated as threats to national
security,” most of which have a predominantly Arab or Muslim populace, were
required to register with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Kim,
Kaourosh, Huckerby, Leine, and Narula, 2007, p. 3). Pakistanis made up the largest
immigrant group from those 25 nations (Powell, 2003). Perhaps as a direct consequence,
Pakistanis were “disproportionately targeted” for deportation and detention (Maira,
2007, p. 44), constituting 40% of deportees in the immediate aftermath of 9/11
(Schulhofer, 2002, p. 11).
The increased surveillance of Muslims further affected Pakistanis because of
Pakistan’s role in global politics over the past decade: On the one hand, Pakistan, a
predominantly Muslim nation, has been named a key ally in the US-led “War on
Terror”; on the other hand, Pakistan has been implicated in terrorist attacks due to the
proliferation (and support) of extremist Madaris (religious seminaries) within Pakistan,
where many terrorists allegedly received training. Additionally, the government of
Pakistan is constantly criticized in media and politics for how it handles militants living
within its borders. The 2010 arrest and conviction of Faisal Shahzad, the would-be
Times Square bomber, who was born in Pakistan but is a naturalized US citizen, once
again brought negative attention to Pakistani-Americans. The recent discovery that
Osama bin-Laden had been living in Pakistan for the past five years has only
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heightened the growing distrust for Pakistanis. In the face of these global and local
political events, and by virtue of their religion and nationality, Pakistani-Americans
have come under increasing scrutiny in the US (Buchen, 2008; Maira, 2007; Sperry,
2004). Working- and lower middle-class Pakistani-Americans, and their children in
particular, face two hurdles: they are Muslim in a part of the world where Muslims are
viewed with suspicion, and they are working class immigrants with little access to
social capital and institutional supports because of social and linguistic barriers (Maira,
2009; Stanton-Salazar, 1997). How, then, do working- and lower middle-class PakistaniAmerican youth in the US cope with rising levels of suspicion in their schools? How do
these youth position themselves in relation to others, and what roles do peers, teachers,
family, and community play in this positioning? In the following pages, I explore these
questions to illustrate the cultural production of “religification.”

Methodology and Theoretical Frame
This study heeds Kathleen Hall’s (2004) call for multi-sited ethnography as a way
to understand the cultural politics involved as immigrants work to be recognized as
citizens of a nation. Hall (2004) argues for greater attention to the production of
immigrant cultural identities within cultural politics in the public sphere. Multi-sited
ethnography is particularly useful for studying immigrant incorporation, as it enables
researchers to “illuminate the more complex cultural processes of nation-formation and
the contradictory and at times incommensurate forms of cultural politics within which
immigrants are made and make themselves as citizens” (p. 108). This notion of making
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oneself and being made (Ong, 1996, p. 156) is the central concern of this paper. I explore
this idea through data from a multi-sited, ethnographic study in which I discuss how
geopolitical shifts shape the cultural production of immigrant youth’s identities and
solidarities in one community in New York City—the city that was most directly
affected by September 11. Within this community, I followed youth through three sites:
a public high-school, their homes, and the ethnic (Punjabi) community in the
surrounding neighborhood.
The seeds for this study were sown in 2004 when I was conducting a small
research project in a primarily working-class Pakistani-immigrant community in New
York City. This community has one of the largest Pakistani-immigrant populations in
the US, largely drawn from rural Punjab. However, it does not by any means reflect the
experiences of all Pakistanis in the US (see Najam, 2008, for a detailed account of
Pakistani immigration to the US). Within this community, the arrival of women and
children was a fairly new phenomenon; thus most of the youth in the study were from
the 1.5 generation; that is, they arrived when they were between the ages of 5 and 12
years, although their fathers had often been in the US much longer than they had. The
fathers were typically construction workers, taxi or limo drivers, or retail workers (in
corner stores and 99-cent stores).
At various times in 2004 and 2007, I interviewed four community leaders and
conducted a focus group with non-Pakistani community organizers. I also conducted
observations at a local community center. Between February 2004 and January 2008, I
collected data at a public high-school that not only had the second largest number of
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recently arrived Pakistani–American students in its borough but was also near the
aforementioned Punjabi-ethnic community. Table 1 provides demographic information
for the school. Among the adults in the school, the only group with any significant
racial diversity was the school safety personnel; the majority of the administration and
teaching staff was white.

[TABLE 1]

There was a sizeable Muslim population in the school, the bulk of which originated
from Pakistan (100 out of 3,000+ students); others came from Palestine, Bangladesh,
Yemen, and India. The significant percentage of Muslim students in the school explains
to some extent the pull that the students felt toward a religious identity.
I first visited the focal high-school in February 2004 and again in December 2004.
I conducted participant observation once a week in spring of 2006. Between November
2006 and June 2007, I visited the school three times a week. A final visit was conducted
in October 2007. In addition to taking copious field notes, I conducted an in-depth, oneon-one interview with each of 17 youths and 12 members of school staff, and facilitated
six focus groups with students (both Pakistani and non-Pakistani). In total, I engaged
with 62 Pakistani-American youths (27 girls, 45 boys) and 17 non-Pakistani youths
during my research. About half of them participated in the focus groups held at the
school; the others interacted with me more sporadically or informally, such as in the
lunchroom, outside school, and in joint student-faculty workspaces. I always had my
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notepad with me and would write down our exchanges during or immediately after the
conversation.
Furthermore, the Urdu class, a unique offering of this school, gave me access to a
concentration of Pakistani-American students. I observed this class consistently and
saw it taught by four different teachers (none of whom were Pakistani or spoke Urdu,
an issue I discuss below). I often assisted the teachers at their request and was therefore
able to solicit writing assignments in which I asked students direct and pointed
questions.
I learned a great deal about some of the youths’ family lives by visiting their
homes. During two of these three visits, I interviewed siblings who did not attend the
focal school, as well as four parental figures. Even when home visits were not possible, I
asked the youths many questions about their home life.
The interviews and conversations with my Pakistani-American participants were
conducted in a mixture of English, Urdu, and Punjabi. Some individuals (both youths
and adults) spoke limited English; we thus spoke exclusively in Urdu or Punjabi. Most
spoke English well but preferred to speak to me in our shared mother tongue.
Through these multiple interactions across time and space (home, school, ethnic
community), I developed an appreciation for the ways in which local and global politics
were shaping constructions of citizenship and influencing notions of belonging among
these working-class and lower middle-class Pakistani-American youth. Drawing on
cultural production theory (Levinson and Holland, 1996), I explored the ways in which
the youths’ positioning reflects a kind of social practice that both “responds to, and
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simultaneously constitutes movements, structures, and discourses beyond the school”
(p. 12). This paper illustrates the complex process that occurs as the youths negotiate the
various expectations of peers, school personnel, families, and communities, and how
this process affects their sense of citizenship, belonging and socialization in schools.
Before discussing citizenship, I would like to reflect on my own identity and its
implications for this study. Like most of my participants, I am of Pakistani origin,
specifically from the Punjab. However, while most of my participants were from
smaller cities or semi-rural towns, I am from the metropolis of Lahore. I also come from
a more affluent background, while most of my participants’ families came from the
middle or lower-middle classes (in fact, many experienced downward social mobility in
the US). Our similar religious and cultural backgrounds gave me a degree of entrée into
the community and made me familiar with the cultures and languages, but I still
consider myself an outsider to the community.

Citizenship, Belonging, and the Politics of Identity
Historically, citizenship has been defined in terms of individual rights, operating
under the assumption of equality as sameness. Mirón, Inda, and Aguirre (1998) contend
that contemporary notions of citizenship in the US (and other Western states) no longer
operate under these assumptions, nor do they focus solely on people as individuals
with equal rights; rather, in some cases, rights depend on group membership.
Consequently, there has been a revival of “cultural nativism,” which calls for a more
restrictive and exclusive citizenship (Mirón et al., 1998, p. 665 ). Given such questions of
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citizenship, Ong (1996) appeals for greater attention to the quotidian practices and
processes by which immigrants in particular are made into subjects of a nation-state (p.
737). Similarly, Kathleen Hall (2004) calls for an understanding of the ways in which
“national identities and citizenship statuses are continually redefined, negotiated, and
debated as they come to be articulated within different forms of nationalist discourse”
(p. 113).
While questions of Muslim (immigrant) incorporation can be traced as far back as
the Rushdie affair of 1989, if not the Iranian revolution, the events of September 11, and
the heightened surveillance and xenophobia that followed, have reified the idea that the
American and Muslim identities are incompatible. Abowitz and Harnish (2006) argue
that since 9/11, there has been a resurgence of “civic, republican values of patriotism,
community, and loyalty to America” (p. 675), which, in effect, questions who can be
American. In this situation, legal citizenship is not enough to claim oneself as an
American or to push back against the construction of non-White immigrants as
perpetual foreigners (Maira, 2009, p. 82). For American-Muslims, the post-9/11
discourse has contributed to the conflation of ”Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim”
identities with “terrorist” and “noncitizen” (Vlopp, 2002, p. 1576); the subtext of this
discourse is that one cannot be both American and Muslim. Several youths in this study
articulated the irreconcilability of an American-Muslim.
The escalating anti-Muslim xenophobia is particularly evident at schools, where
Muslim youth are constructed as “national outsiders and enemies” (Abu el-Haj, 2007, p.
301). Abu el-Haj (2007) observes that schools not only help to construct the symbolic
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boundaries of the nation by defining membership, but also by providing particular
knowledge and resources that help immigrants make sense of their new homes. For
example, the focal high-school offered an Urdu class to cater to the growing Pakistani
population in the school. This class was not initiated as a language class but as a
“citizen orientation program” to help students “become acquainted with the culture
and expectations for citizens in the US” (interview with assistant principal,
03/07/2006). In fact, Urdu was not even taught in the class because it was difficult to
find a certified Urdu teacher. Furthermore, Pakistani-American students who did not
want to take the class were told they must by their guidance counselors. Thus the class
was a strange contradiction: it touted citizenship as well as inclusiveness through the
validation of students’ backgrounds and languages, but in reality it served to segregate
the students.
As this article has already begun to demonstrate, the experiences of PakistaniAmericans in public schools in the US (and especially New York City—the area most
directly affected by the 9/11 attacks) reflect a complicated relationship between the
notions of citizenship and national belonging, particularly for these transnational
youths in this historic moment. While the usefulness of the idea of a nation-state has
been weakened by globalization and the flow of goods, information, and people across
borders, the desire to belong to a national community maintains a strong hold on the
imagination (Yuval-Davis et al., 2005; Abu el-Haj, 2007). In a parallel case with
Palestinian youth, Abu el-Haj (2007) argues that, on the one hand,
Youth experience their position as outside the “imagined community” of the
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United States nation, framing them as “enemies within.” As a result, they struggle
to feel a sense of belonging to the nation to which they hold citizenship. On the
other hand, these Palestinian-American youth view their United States citizenship
positively in terms of legal and political rights and economic success. Yet, they tie
their national identities—their sense of where they belong—to a Palestinian
homeland. (p. 287)
Middle East politics may make the Palestinian-American experience different from that
of Pakistani-Americans. But for Pakistani-American youth in the post-9/11 climate, like
Palestinian-Americans, legal citizenship does not necessarily evoke feelings of
belonging to the US, which is compounded by the ways in which these youth are
positioned by teachers and peers, as well as themselves. Belonging, Yuval-Davis and
her colleagues (2005) suggest, is not simply about “membership, rights, and duties, but
also about the emotions that such memberships evoke” that manifest in the ways in
which “subjects feel about their location in the social world” (p. 526). It is thus
emotionally charged, which makes it a “thicker” concept than citizenship (p. 526).
Because citizenship and belonging are entwined with the goals of assimilation, which
are based on sameness and are hence exclusionary, when people sense that they are
being excluded, “the notion of belonging is activated” (pp. 526-527).
These questions of belonging are not entirely new for Muslims: In reference to pre9/11 research on Muslims, Gibson (1997) suggests that religious markers, such as the
hijab, serve as areas of contestation between Muslim immigrants and their schools and
societies (p. 441). The critical factor, she argues, is not “the origins of the differences …
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but rather that the differences are viewed as markers of identity” (p. 441). This is
exacerbated in the post-9/11 context. Purkayastha (2005) observes that post-9/11 media
and political discourses and policies about difference have encouraged this use of
religion as a marker; as a result, “Muslims are a new globally racialized category,
irrespective of national and cultural difference” (p. 12). I would add that not only do
others categorize individual groups of Muslims, such as Pakistanis, through a religious
lens above any other, but in the post-9/11 climate, Pakistanis and other groups
themselves more actively participate in the production of a religious identity. This is
what I term religification.

“Self-making and being made”: The cultural production of religification
Religification is the simultaneous ascription and co-option of a religious identity
over all other common markers of difference (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender). It is a process
of both “self-making and being made” (Ong, 1996, p. 156). Thus, to understand
religification in action, we must study the ways in which Muslim and non-Muslim
peers, teachers, families, and the larger community view Muslim youth, and the ways
in which the youths themselves contribute to and react to the climate surrounding
them.
For many Pakistani-American youths in my research, September 11 was a turning
point in their academic and social lives because of the ways in which they were verbally
(and sometimes physically) attacked and ostracized by peers and, occasionally, even by
teachers. Despite steps taken by schools and other groups to increase awareness and

14

The Religification of Pakistani-American Youth

understanding about Islam and to reduce stereotypes surrounding Muslims, such
actions are usually simply “cultural embraces” or “cosmetic accommodations” (Garcia,
2006, p. 170). For example, when I asked to see the curriculum for the Urdu class, one
Urdu teacher (a white Christian immigrant) showed me a thick binder from a daylong
professional development session about Muslims that was held immediately after 9/11
at a local university. Aside from the fact this professional development session had little
to do with teaching Urdu (except that most of the students in the Urdu class were
Muslim), the teacher never used any of the lessons in her class. Abu el-Haj (2002)
suggests that education about Muslims generally tends to reflect “the most banal and
benign sense of multiculturalism. The script is a familiar one: We may do culture
differently, but underneath it all we are all essentially the same” (p. 311). Thus, the view
of “Muslim as other”—terrorist, narrow-minded, oppressed—remains embedded in
public discourse. However, this was not always the mainstream view of Muslims and
Pakistanis.
From the perspective of the youth in this study, before September 11, no one really
knew or cared who Pakistanis were or whether someone was a Pakistani. As one 16year-old Pakistani-American high-school girl put it: “After September 11, I think
everybody started knowing who Pakis [4] really are. … Before that it wasn’t really
common. No one really cared” (focus group, 05/15/2007).
Similarly, Saad, a 14-year-old boy, explained that before September 11, people
were ambivalent about whether someone was a Pakistani; after September 11, in
contrast, being Pakistani meant being Muslim, which meant being different: “They see
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Muslim people as different. Like, before there was just, like, regular people, you’re from
Pakistan … they don't think of it [being Pakistani] as a good thing or a bad thing”
(interview, 04/24/2007).
One result of “being different” was that many youths who once got along with
students of all backgrounds reported that friends changed their behavior after
September 11. For example, Bano, a high-school sophomore who was away in Pakistan
on September 11, returned to school in 2002 to find that “it felt like people looked at me
differently. Even my old friends would say, ‘you’re, like, one of them, too’” (interview,
05/29/2007). Students reported such experiences both within the school walls and in
the larger community. Huriya, a high-school junior, recounted, “People look at you like
you’re a terrorist. Like, they just look at you, and they don’t want to sit with you, like, in
the train ... especially old ladies” (interview, 06/11/2007). Another 16-year-old girl, who
did not attend school [5], explained her frustration at this negativity toward Pakistanis
this way: “It’s not like the World Trade Center was brought down and that Pakistanis
are responsible for bringing it down” (yeh to nahee hai keh World Trade Center gir giya hai
key Pakistanio ney giraya hai”) (interview, 3/29/2007).
In regard to increasing scrutiny that Pakistanis in general experienced after
September 11, one mother reasoned, “Perhaps it was in our minds” (Shahid hamaray
zehen mein tha), suggesting that they themselves imagined a change in people’s
behaviors (interview, 04/03/2007). Whether the changes in other people’s attitudes
were real or imagined (an interesting caveat that warrants further exploration), the fact
is that the lives of young Pakistani-Americans changed. Their sense of exclusion
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translated into behaviors that only served to compound their outsider status. Several
youths talked about how they got into verbal and physical fights or caused trouble for
their teachers. Most significantly, the youths circumscribed their social lives, preferring
to associate with Muslim (and usually only Pakistani) students rather than their
previous diverse group of friends. In doing so, the youth identified strongly with a
religious identity that was ascribed to them but that they also embraced.
On the one hand, the Pakistani-American youth in this study were essentially
stripped of their national and ethnic identities—Pakistani, American, South Asian, Desi
[6]—and their religion became the primary prism through which they were seen by
peers, teachers, and members of the school community. In effect, religion segregated
Pakistani-American youth, by marking their similarity to other South Asian and Middle
Eastern students, all presumed to be Muslim, and their significant difference from most
peers. On the other hand, the Pakistani-American youth increasingly identified
themselves as Muslim because doing so allowed them to transform the negative
experience of being ostracized into a positive experience of solidarity and group
membership with other Muslims, both in their immediate community and globally.
Embracing a Muslim identity might make it seem that Pakistani-American youth
were becoming increasingly religious. However, this was not necessarily the case.
Kaviraj (2010) argues that the growing religiosity in many parts of the world is quite
different from our traditional understanding of religion (in his writing, he refers to
rising Hindu identity and nationalism). He argues that we need to distinguish between
“thick and thin religion.” Thick religion encompasses traditional rituals, practices, and
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beliefs, whereas thin religion intersects religion, politics and nationalism and serves as a
tool to bring people together for a cause, such as Hindu nationalism or Muslim
victimhood (a ploy of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda).
Many students recounted that September 11 was a turning point in the way they
experienced schooling, and they used it to explain why a religious identity had become
more attractive to them. The following are some of the students’ written responses to a
question about whether race or class had affected their school experiences. Rather than
focus on racism, several students wrote about September 11:
My school experience was pretty good before 9/11. However, in sixth grade,
after 9/11, I have been looked [at] as a stereotype. Everybody used to call me a
terrorist. All through Junior high-school, people used to call me Ossama or
Saddam. (Latif, 15-year-old boy)

At one point after 9/11 it really did [change] because of my religion and where I
come from. The kids in my class used to call me “terrorist” but that really didn’t
bother me because I didn’t care for what they said. (Yasir, 14-year-old boy)

There was no concern for it [race, ethnicity] until 9/11. Then kids would talk
trash, and they would get beaten up. (Tariq, 16-year-old boy)

Around 9/11 students use to bother me and tease me because I was the only
Muslim there (except my brother who was teased too). (Ishra, 17-year-old girl)
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The ostracism that the youth experienced after 9/11 strengthened their identification as
Muslims while widening the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims, thereby making
the possibility of being “American” less attainable. This was poignantly articulated by a
group of Pakistani-Muslim girls in a focus group:
Soroiya: Everything has a stereotype, and there’s a stereotype for Americans.
AGK: What is that stereotype?
Soroiya: Like, being White.
Iffat: Italian.
Soroiya: Christian.
Marina: Definitely not Muslim. Ever since September 11, definitely not Muslim.
(focus group, 05/15/2007)
Marina’s statement—“ever since September 11, definitely not Muslim” —is particularly
telling. She had just started seventh grade in 2001, and before September 11, she did not
associate with other Pakistanis. Like several high-achieving Pakistani-American
students I talked with (particularly those who were second generation), she expressed a
lack of trust and trustworthiness for and among Pakistanis and explained that her
parents taught her to avoid Pakistanis in order to remain focused on her studies. But
after September 11, increasing anti-Muslim sentiment pushed Marina to associate with
Pakistanis and other Muslims, a group where she now felt a sense of belonging. As a
result, she started to identify herself as Muslim (but not Pakistani). This was not so
much because she was a practicing Muslim but because she felt she could no longer
claim an American identity. Marina, who was born in the US and had never traveled to
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Pakistan, continued, “I feel weird saying I’m American because American people, they
don’t like Muslims so much” (focus group discussion, 05/15/2007).
The dislike for Muslims that the youth experienced ranged from verbal spats to
physical fights. Almost every Pakistani-American youth I spoke with said that at some
point after September 11, he or she had been called a terrorist. Many said that by the
mid-2000s, fewer people labeled them as terrorists, but the term continued to come up.
For example, during a focus group with primarily non-Muslim and non-Pakistani
students, one (non-Muslim) girl explained how her attitude toward Pakistanis evolved
after September 11:
I wouldn’t even look at them, but now, like, I became friends with them, and I
noticed that it’s not their fault, that, you know, they’re not all bad. You know. It’s
just that one group that makes everybody look bad. Like, I know Marina; Marina
is not a terrorist. (05/22/2007)
Despite her change in attitude, this student’s final comment that “Marina is not a
terrorist” indicates that the association of Pakistani youth with terrorism continued for
years after September 11. It is highly unlikely that any of the students at the high-school
were terrorists, yet the stereotype still hung in the air. Table 2 exemplifies this and also
illustrates Vlopp’s (2002) assertion that within political—and hence public—discourse
there has been a conflation of the terms “Muslim,” “terrorist,” and “noncitizen”:

[TABLE 2]
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Interestingly, the Pakistani-American youth similarly conflated “Muslim” and
“non-American” and increasingly identified as Muslims as a way to find a community
where they were easily accepted, since they felt they could not be American. Thus this
increasing identification with Muslims was not necessarily due to heightened feelings
of religiosity; in fact, at times, the youth took advantage of school personnel’s
heightened awareness of Islamic practices (or political correctness) in order to gain
certain privileges. For example, a number of boys frequently cut school on Friday
afternoons, using the excuse, unofficially sanctioned by the school, that they had to go
to Friday prayers. However, most of the boys simply went to the park instead of, or
immediately after, attending the mosque. Thus the boys were in fact practicing what
Kaviraj (2010) describes as thin religion. This is important to understand as it forces us
to distinguish between religiosity that is transcendental versus that which is more
instrumental. However, I do not wish to suggest that thin religion is devoid of spiritual
content or that thick religion is lacking political or instrumental motivation—religious
practice and belief are far more flexible than that.
An example of the complexity of religion in these young people’s lives comes
from the girls in my study, some of whom wore a hijab (the Muslim headscarf). Some
girls wore a hijab because they believed it was their religious duty (thick religion); other
girls wore a hijab to make a political statement about their religious identity (thin
religion); others wore a hijab simply because their parents made them do so. In fact, I
heard many times that some girls wore a hijab as they left their house and then put it
away at school; their reasons included not wanting to stand out, fear of discrimination,
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and a desire to rebel against their parents. It might appear that the girls who removed
the hijab in school were rejecting a religious identity, yet these same girls would refer to
themselves as Muslim.
Despite the varying reasons that youth were drawn to religious identities,
religification had serious ramifications for them, particularly in public settings such as
schools. For example, Walid, a high-school senior who arrived in the US at the age of
two, had experienced many overt and covert moments of stereotyping, especially since
September 11. Partly as a reaction to this, he provoked teachers in class. He often
challenged teachers by saying that certain things, such as listening to music, were
“against his religion.” However, I observed him listening to music on someone’s iPod in
the lunchroom. When I asked whether he really held the views he expressed in class, he
replied with a laugh: “I just say that to get them mad. Because I like it when people get
angry … I do it to a lot of teachers“ (fieldnotes, 06/12/2007).
Thus religion helped Walid cope with the discrimination he experienced as a
young Muslim man; in other words, religious identification served as a kind of defense
mechanism. Although this may seem like a reasonable strategy under the
circumstances, it creates a vicious cycle: Peers and teachers ostracize PakistaniAmerican youth, who react and provoke their peers and teachers, thereby reaffirming
the initial stereotypical beliefs. This cycle, which often ended with the youth being
punished, heightened these students’ sense of victimization even in cases where they
were in the wrong. For example, Iffat, a 1.5 generation youth, discussed her most
“racist” teacher (here, racism was equated with being anti-Muslim), who had failed her
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in summer school because she missed a few classes. Iffat was unwilling to accept that
her poor attendance was the cause of the failing grade, preferring to blame the teacher’s
views about Muslims (interview, 04/24/2007). Such problematic perceptions of self and
others are particularly evident in the way the “terrorist” stereotype was used by both
students and teachers.
Dangerous Boys, Oppressed Girls
The terrorist label came up frequently in discussions with the youth and seemed to
be one of the reasons they started ascribing a Muslim identity to themselves. At times,
youths criticized the terrorist stereotype. Iffat recounted how, in middle school, her
peers would say things like, “Oh, they’re Pakis, oh, they’re terrorists.” Such statements
would anger her, and she recalled fighting back, asking, “What makes me a terrorist?
It’s not like I was involved in it” (Focus group, 05/15/2007). More often, however,
youths co-opted the terrorist stereotype and used it to suggest power over non-Muslims
and a shared identity with fellow Muslims, as the following excerpts illustrate:
Walid: People in school were scared of me … I said something bad to them, “Yo,
I’m going to blow up your house.”
AGK: Why did you say that?
Walid: Just to scare them. So I became, like, an outcast, a rebel, and it felt good.
AGK: It felt good?
Walid: I felt different. … They threatened me, Miss. I didn’t just say, “I’m going
to blow up your house.” Only if they picked on me, then—“Oh, I’m going to
fight you outside!” “Oh yeah? I’m going to blow up your house.” (interview,

23

The Religification of Pakistani-American Youth

06/12/2007)
Walid’s story was just one of many where, when Pakistani-American youth felt
cornered, they took on the ascribed persona of terrorist. In another example Soroiya
recounted how she and a male student were speaking Urdu when they were
reprimanded by a teacher, “This is America; talk in English,” to which the boy replied
“No miss, we’re terrorists” (Focus group, 05/15/2007). This appropriation of the
terrorist stereotype is analogous to Willis’s (1977) working-class lads “having a laff” (p.
29). Willis argued that the use of humor and lack of seriousness in school was the lads’
response to their understanding of schooling as a dead end. In a similar way, playing
into the terrorist stereotype was how Pakistani-American youth responded to the ways
in which they were viewed, and it is through the production of these forms that the
youths’ subjectivities developed, especially their sense of citizenship and belonging.
Although the appropriation of the terrorist label was more common among the
boys in the study, some of the girls also took this route to deal with the hostile
environment at school. Marina recounted: “At first I did not fight so much, but I got
into so many fights. Because we couldn’t sit there while people called us ‘terrorist,
terrorist.’” She continued, “Now we just joke about it. We’ll be, like, ‘Get away from us,
or we’ll bomb you.’ … You know how you make a joke out of stuff because it bothers
you but you don’t want to show that it bothers you? You joke about it, I guess.” (focus
group, 05/15/2007). Thus, while the youth no longer took the name-calling seriously,
they continued to play into it. Moreover, the ostracism Marina experienced after
September 11 drew her to fellow Pakistanis and to a common Muslim identity that had
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not appealed to her before:
Before we came to this school, we mostly didn’t talk to Paki kids or Muslims; we
didn’t even like being Muslim back then. We didn’t even want to be Pakistani,
we didn’t want to be talking to our own kind of people; we just didn’t like them.
(focus group, 05/15/2007)
While the above examples are of incidents between peers, the ascription of the
terrorist label and negative behaviors toward Muslim students was also evident in
teachers’ interactions with Muslim students. Talah, a high-school sophomore, relayed
an incident in a classroom where an Arab student was asking his teacher how she came
to school. The teacher allegedly replied, “The Verrazano Bridge. Why, do you want to
blow it up?” (fieldnotes, 05/07/2007). Regardless of the intention of such remarks, or
whether they were even true or not, they reproduce the trope of the youth as terrorists;
this trope circulates among the youth seemingly unchallenged and thus remains on the
minds of students for years, directly affecting their sense of belonging to the nation.
Teachers also made remarks in jest or without apparent malice that, nevertheless,
contributed to a climate whereby Pakistani-American and other Muslim students were
seen as terrorists, which in turn affected their sense of belonging. Recall the focus group
where one girl said, “Marina is not a terrorist.” The girls’ teacher, who was also part of
this group, jumped in and laughingly replied, “Oh yes she is!” (focus group,
05/22/2007). Although the remark was meant to be humorous, and the teacher who
said it is loved and respected by the students, this sort of seemingly benign statement is
what psychologist Derald Wing Sue calls racial micro-aggression (Sue, Bucceri, Lin,
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Nadal, and Torino, 2007). Micro-aggression is a contemporary form of racism that is
invisible, unintentional, subtle in nature, and typically outside the level of conscious
awareness, but it creates a hostile and invalidating climate nonetheless. According to
Sue and colleagues, the cumulative effect of micro-aggressions may be just as harmful
as outright racism, although more research is needed in this regard (p. 279).
Reacting to the perceived behavioral problems of some Pakistani-American
students, teachers often reminisced about a “golden era” of past students, who were
described as submissive and quiet. Teachers who had worked with Pakistani-American
students since the mid-1990s talked about how the students had changed. In
Valenzuela’s (1999) ethnography about Mexican-American immigrant youth, she writes
that contemporary students fail to conform to the “misty, mythical image of their
historical counterparts,” that is, the good, quiet, deferential immigrant; thus, newer
immigrants “seem deficient, so teachers find it hard to see them in an appreciative,
culture-affirming way” (p. 66). In the same way, teachers in my study saw
contemporary Pakistani-American students as having more behavioral problems than
their predecessors, which the teachers correlated with length of time in the US and with
the students’ religion. On several occasions, teachers used the words “narrow-minded”
or “inflexible” to describe Pakistani and Muslim students in general (especially boys);
they attributed these qualities to the students’ religious beliefs. For example, when I
asked a social studies teacher about his experiences with Pakistani-American students
specifically, he replied:
The biggest problem that I have, and I have had, I think, over the last couple of
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years with the kids is, sometimes, when there are political discussions in class,
um, right or wrong, I find that the, the Muslim kids in general are very—they’re
not flexible to really listen to the other side of the story. (interview, 05/18/2007)
Notice that my question was about Pakistani-American students specifically, but the
answer was about “Muslim kids in general.” This kind of lumping together under a
narrowly defined but broadly applied category strengthens the idea that Muslims are a
monolithic group, ignoring individual differences—an idea that is reinforced by media
representations of Muslims. In fact, many teachers simply assumed (often incorrectly)
that students were Muslim based on their skin color, thus conflating racial and religious
and sometimes even national categories.
At other times, teachers failed to see their own role in instigating problematic
behavior. In another social studies class, a teacher wanted to show the students a
picture of Prophet Mohammad (fieldnotes, 12/5/2006). Given that this occurred on the
heels of the Danish cartoon controversy, I cautioned the teacher that doing so could
provoke an angry reaction from the Muslim students because depicting Mohammad in
visual form is considered blasphemous in Islam. The potential for such a reaction only
confirmed the teacher’s stereotype of Muslims as “problem” students; the teacher never
considered the possibility that the picture could truly be insulting.
While teachers often viewed Pakistani-American boys as problem students,
Pakistani-American girls were sometimes seen as oppressed victims of Islam to be
pitied. In their interviews with me, teachers frequently brought up the restrictions
placed on girls by their families and equated them with Islamic tradition. “Sexual
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policing” occurs in many groups, immigrant or otherwise (see Harris, 2004; Lopez,
2003; Purkayastha, 2005; Zhou and Bankston, 1998), but many teachers believed that it
was a product of Pakistani culture, which they considered to be synonymous with
Islam.
As a result of this belief, several teachers assumed that many Pakistani-American
girls would not be allowed to go to college and that they would be “married off” or
would only be allowed to study in a short vocational program. Such viewpoints
affected the kind of guidance the girls received at the school. For instance, one of the
guidance counselors told me that girls tried to stall graduation so that they could avoid
marriage (interview, 04/15/2007). Similarly, one of the assistant principals recounted:
“I’ve had several girls who have been married off, I guess, for lack of a better term. It’s a
reality. It’s a different culture. You know, it’s a different culture” (interview,
05/18/2007).
In fact, only one of the 27 focal girls in the study indicated that she might be
facing such a fate, and in that case, there was a very particular reason that this was a
possibility. [7] Nor were any of the girls trying to stall graduation. This might have
occurred in the past, but it no longer appeared to be a concern for the girls, even though
the perception remained that early marriage was a part of Pakistani culture. School
personnel’s view of culture as static and impervious to change affected the ways in
which the youth were treated in school. However, as the next section illustrates, notions
of culture among the Pakistani (immigrant) community were also somewhat static.
Questioning “Authenticity”
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Most young Pakistanis reported that their parents were quite religious, and the
youth’s religious identities were entwined with national ones. This may be particular to
Pakistanis, as Pakistan was founded as a homeland for Muslims: For most families,
then, being an “authentic Pakistani” required simultaneously being an “authentic
Muslim.” Despite their working-class backgrounds, which meant they could travel to
Pakistan only infrequently, if at all, the youth maintained strong ties to Pakistan
through media (the homes I visited all subscribed to Pakistani cable channels via
satellite), and connected with family via video chat, email, and phone. Further, given
the configurations of culture and nation in the US, where middle- and upper-class white
Anglo-Saxon Protestants are marked as the norm and others are hyphenated Americans
(Alba and Nee, 1997), these youth rarely entertained the idea that they could be
American without giving up their “Pakistani-ness” or “Muslim-ness.” Thus the youth
felt significant dissonance in their efforts to be ”authentic” Pakistanis or (more often)
“authentic” Muslims while also being teenagers in an American high-school. For the
youth in my study, being an authentic Pakistani meant resisting all things American, or
what the youth and their families referred to as Americanization. Rashaad, an
academically engaged 14-year-old boy, explained: “Americanization is the worse thing
that can happen to you. Americanization is like when you lose your culture” (interview,
06/08/07). To the higher-achieving youth, Americanization meant that peers were
trying to act “ghetto” or “black.” For lower-achieving youth, Americanization meant
that peers were “acting white” (see Fordham and Ogbu, 1986). Though the definition of
Americanization varied among the youth and their families, the common
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(essentializing) themes across these definitions were a lack of religiosity, sexual
promiscuity, drinking, and taking drugs. As a result, youth felt caught between two
contrasting ideologies (see Hall, 2002)—the ideology of being Pakistani and the
ideology of being American. Walid explained that it was extremely difficult for him to
reconcile his Muslim identity with an American one:
It’s like on one side you’re pushing religion and on the other side being
American, but you can’t have both. Being Muslim is hard. Our parents never told
us that being Muslim is going to be easy. You have to hold on to that heritage
and not let it go. (fieldnotes, 05/07/2007)
Schools were the particular sites where this struggle took place.
Although being Muslim and being American were viewed as static and in binary
opposition, in fact, the conflicting expectations that these youth faced were not conflicts
between two distinctive “bounded” cultures (Hall, 2004); rather, they were tensions
surrounding the different expectations for them as Pakistanis and as Americans. Being
Pakistani or following tradition was seen as superior to being American or modern. The
Pakistani community’s construction of a binary classification, in which
Pakistani/Muslim meant culturally superior and Western/American meant culturally
inferior, was, as Maira (2002) suggests, “an attempt to reverse the racial hierarchy
imposed on immigrant communities of color by asserting a cultural nationalism in
response, a defensive move to compensate for the degradations of racism” (p. 133).
For Pakistani families, cultural nationalism is directly tied to Islam. Abu el-Haj (2007)
criticizes the mainstream view of situating Islam within the discourse of culture. But
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Muslims, or at least these Pakistani families, are just as prone to equate Islam with
(Pakistani) culture. In fact, some families were highly critical of Pakistanis but embraced
aspects of Pakistani culture that were grounded in religion. This is not particular to
Pakistani-American Muslims; Werbner’s (2002) research on South Asian Diasporic
communities in the UK found that, in general, British-Pakistanis’ national identity was
subsumed under a Muslim identity. Thus, a way for families to maintain cultural purity
was to teach their children that the “Muslim way of life” was superior to the American
way. Here, religion served as a way to hold on to what was culturally valuable to the
families while settling in a new place. As such, religion provided a “metaphor of
continuity … a postcolonial means of recuperating a (continuous) tradition in the face of
a (disjunctive) modernity” (Biswas, 2002, p.192).
This strategy of using religion as a moral compass might not have been as
successful for Pakistani youth were it not for the way Pakistanis and Muslims in general
have been discriminated against on the basis of their religion in the aftermath of
September 11, particularly in schools. For most of the youth, in the post-9/11 climate,
the expectations of tradition associated with being Pakistani from the family and ethnic
community were generally stronger than the expectations of modernity associated with
being American from the school and larger society. Negotiating these different values
and expectations was not easy for youth, and many of them attested to this struggle. As
Marina explained:
I didn’t understand what side you’re supposed to be on or anything. Like, you
know, on one hand, you’re Muslim, and they’re saying, “You’re Muslim, go this
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way”; on the other hand, you’re American, and you have to be like this. Like, if
you go to the American side, they’re never going to think of you as American,
but if you go to the Muslim side, you’re not Muslim enough. (focus group,
05/15/2007)
Soroiya concurred. Referring to both the Pakistani-Muslim and mainstream
communities’ views, she said: “We’re not Muslim enough, and we’re not American
enough” (focus group, 05/15/2007). Not being “Muslim enough” was a serious issue
for the youth and their families, and as a result they questioned who was an authentic
Pakistani, a conversation that was juxtaposed with what was considered Islamic and the
negative attitude toward Americanization.
A Muslim identity was thus a way for Pakistani youth to connect to a larger
community without losing their heritage and culture, which many of them and their
families deemed incompatible with American culture. This identification with Islam did
not necessarily increase their religiosity, but it did affect their socialization. For
example, Rashaad identified himself as Muslim but nonetheless said that he did not
consider himself religious (in fact, he was drawn to Confucianism), yet most of his
friends were Muslim (though not necessarily Pakistani). For him, having Muslim
friends, even though he was not religious himself, gave him a sense of belonging and
camaraderie with other youths who also experienced discrimination in school and
society in the wake of 9/11. Thus home-lessons, coupled with experiences in schools,
affected who youth socialized with.
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Concluding Remarks
The research presented here pushes us to understand the ways in which the
global makes the local and, in turn, the local makes the global by illustrating how sociopolitical discourses are appropriated and/or resisted on the ground: Not only are
Pakistani-American youth frequently positioned by others as outsiders based on their
(perceived) religion, their sense of exclusion translates into behaviors and the co-option
of identities that serve to reinforce their outsider status. Religification thus has serious
ramifications for Pakistani-American youth and the ways in which they are constructed
as “noncitizens.”
The humiliations and exclusions that the Pakistani-American youth in my study
experienced post-9/11, when many were in middle school, heightened their need to
find acceptance and belonging in high school. In an era where security concerns and
uncertainty dominate, the cultural production of identity, particularly in school sites,
develops in unexpected ways: While these youth creatively contested negative views of
Islam, the ensuing cultural production of identity was not always positive. The youth
felt that an American identity was no longer an option in the post-9/11 world, a
realization that increased their desire to find other ways to belong, such as elevating
their Muslim identity, playing into the terrorist stereotype, and, in a sense, rejecting
their American citizenship.
This notion of belonging at the cost of one’s “American-ness” is being challenged
by young Muslim-Americans who lay claim both to their religion and to American
citizenship; however, this seems to occur when youth have access to certain kinds of
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social and cultural capital, for example, in college (see Bayoumi, 2008). Thus, class and
social networks are key variables that need to be explored more systematically and
across multiple sites and spaces.
In suggesting that class is a contributing factor in the religification process, I am
not implying that race has lost its significance. Rather, religion mediates the interplay of
global politics, national political and ethnic ideologies, and local interpretations of race
and nation in the lives of Pakistani-American youth”. While it is difficult to ascertain
the durability of religification, it is clear that religification the process is intimately tied
to the “War on Terror”. As long as the “War on Terror“ remains central in US and
global politics, religification will continue to have serious implications for Muslim
youths’ education, employment, and socialization.
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Notes:
1. Muslims around the world rioted after The Satanic Verses, bringing attention to
themselves; however, in the case of the terrorist attack on September 11, it is because
the perpetrators were allegedly Muslims (from Saudi Arabia) that Muslims were
brought into the limelight.
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2. Pakistani-American is the term I use for all first- and second-generation youth of
Pakistani origin, irrespective of citizenship or immigration status.

3. Examples of news magazine titles published during my research: National Geographic
(September 2007): Islam’s Fault Line, The Struggle for Pakistan’s Soul; Newsweek
(October 29, 2007): The most dangerous nation in the world isn’t Iraq. It’s Pakistan;
The Economist (January 3, 2008): The World’s Most Dangerous Place. Pakistan; Time
(January 14, 2008) No one could save Benazir Bhutto. Why we need to save Pakistan;
New York Times Magazine (September 7, 2007): Talibanistan

4. “Pakis” is a pejorative term used in the UK for South Asians, particularly BritishPakistanis. However, the majority of youths in my study were unaware of this and
used it in a positive sense.

5. When I first visited a Pakistani-immigrant community in New York, I met girls of
school-going age who were not permitted by their families (usually their fathers) to
attend public school. This is an alarming trend in such communities and warrants
further research.

6. Desi is a term of endearment used loosely to identify people from South Asia,
primarily Pakistanis, Indians, and Bangladeshis.
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7. This girl’s family was exploring the possibility of marriage for her and her sister due
to unique circumstances: the father was on disability and unable to work. He had
four daughters and no sons. The eldest daughter was married, the second eldest was
in community college, the younger two were at the high-school. The middle two
girls had to work to help make ends meet for the family. The father felt ashamed
that his daughters had to work, thus he wished for his daughters to be married
quickly so that their husbands could support the girls rather than them having to
support him and his wife.
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Table 1. Demographics of the focal high-school
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS 2005-06

# of students
[out of 3067]

% of student
body

Eligible for Free Lunch
Reduced-Price Lunch
Limited English Proficient

1925
290
573

63%
9%
19%

6
303
865
783

0%
10%
28%
26%

1110

36%

RACE / ETHNICITY
American Indian or Alaska Native
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Asian or Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific
Islander
White
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Table 2. Responses From Peer Mediators Who Participated In A Focus Group.
What three words come to mind when
you think of Pakistanis?

What are three things (words, phrases,
images) that come to mind when you hear
about Pakistanis? (e.g. in class, when they
come up in mediation, on the news,
outside of school, etc.)

Muslim, Strict, Indian movies

Girl fight, Guy jumpings, Terrorist

Ethnic, Culture, Music

Terrorist, Bad English, Nothing

Swimming

People, Language

Spicy food, Muslim, Long shirts with
pants

Smell , Terrorists

Muslim, Hajab [sic]

-

Muslim

-

Sexy, Girls, Holla

-

War, 9/11

Nothing

A girl in my class

Arabic, Nose ring, Terrorist
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